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There is, however, much in the history of the emigration of the French aristocracy and of French provincial counter-revolutionary risings after 1789 which can only be properly understood in terms of the political circumstances and the social and economic tendencies under the Ancien Regime. One advantage in studying the counter-revolution as, to some extent, a continuation of political and constitutional struggles whose roots ran deeply into French history, is that the divisions and mutual distrust between the emigre princes and the French sovereigns, whose interests they were supposed to have in trust, thereby become intelligible. Even the leadership of the emigre counter-revolution was in dispute between two former Ministers of the Crown, Calonne, representing the views and interests of the Comte d'Artois, and de Breteuil, the personal representative of Louis XVI. The suspicion and distrust which Marie Antoinette felt for the emigre princes is well known, but it is not always appreciated that one reason for this division was the totally opposed views held by the reigning, but captive, monarchs and their exiled representatives as to what should be restored if the counter-revolution was successful.1 Much of this division and recrimination was the product of the different circumstances in which the French sovereigns and the emigre princes found themselves at the time. Both were far from being free agents the King and Queen being the prisoners of the revolutionaries, and the exiled princes the prisoners of the emigres. But the conflict of views should also be related to the rival court factions, the personal antipathies and the clash of policies between the aristocracy and the monarchy before the summons of the States General. If the counter revolutionary manifestoes and proclamations of the emigre princes are examined closely, due allowance being made for their propagandist character, and in conjunction with the secret policy memoranda of the time, it will be realized that their underlying motive was not merely to reject the new French revolutionary constitution, which Louis XVI had been compelled to accept in September 1791, but also to resume the attack on the kind of Enlightened Despotism, which the king had sponsored, as an alternative to national bankruptcy, in 1787.1 The objective of the emigre princes and of the counter-revolution proper was not, in other words, a simple restoration of monarchical despotism as it had existed before 1789, or even of the social structure of the Ancien Regime, but rather the creation of a restricted monarchy, based upon the revival of corporate and provincial privileges.2 Hence, on the one hand, the antagonism between the French sovereigns and the emigre princes, and, on the other, the appeal of the counter-revolution to the local population of those areas in France, such as Brittany, where the traditions of independent particularism were so strong.
A second general tendency which may be noticed is the greater emphasis now given to the more detailed study of the series of civil wars in France, which form the local background to the counter-revolution.3 This regional approach to the history of the counter-revolution is one which again will well repay further extension, and it is as a minor contribution to this kind of enquiry that the present paper may, perhaps, be justified. Necessarily, however, progress in this direction will depend primarily upon the activities of French local historians and archivists. The matter is in safe hands and we may confidently expect that many new and hitherto unsuspected aspects of the counter-revolution will be revealed.
A final, and perhaps superfluous, remark upon the way in which counter-revolutionary studies may be expected to develop 1 A. Goodwin, " Calonne, the Assembly of French Notables of 1787 and the origins of the Rdvolte Nobiliaire", English Historical Review, Ixi (1946), 202-34 and 329-77. 2 By a restricted monarchy the counter-revolutionaries meant, not a limited monarchy of the English type, which was favoured by Necker and the party of the Monarchiens, but a monarchy bound by the " fundamental laws of the kingdom " as interpreted by the Parlements.
3 E.g. S. Brugal, " Les camps de Jales ", Revue de la Revolution, vols. 4-7 (1884-5) ; L. Dubreuil, " L'idee regionaliste sous la Revolution ", Amala Rlvolutionnaires, vols. ix-xi (1917-19) ; C Riffaterre, Le mauvement anti-jacobin et anti-Parisien a Lyon et dans le Rh6ne-et-Loire en 1793 (1912 ; P. Nicolle, " Le mouvement fed£raliste dans 1'Ome en 1793 ", Annales Historiques de la Revolution frantaise. xiii (1936) , 481-512 ; xiv (193 A 215-33 ; xv (1938), 12-53, 289-313,385-410. in the future, concerns the opportunities awaiting British historians in this field, if only more systematic use is made of the original sources in this country. One of the most fruitful ways in which British scholars could contribute to the progress of research in the history of the counter-revolution would be to exploit more fully the manuscript and printed treasures of the Public Record Office and British Museum and not least of the great provincial libraries, such as the John Rylands Library and the Sheffield Central Reference Library.1 Pre-eminent in this respect are the Calonne papers in the Public Record Office, which have now been classified and indexed, so as to make them more readily accessible to students than they formerly were.2 I have made a limited use of them for this study and most of what I have to say about the organization of the Breton conspiracy of la Rouerie is derived from a study of these papers, though I have also made use of the police records of the National Convention in the Paris archives.
Despite what has already been said about the way in which the divisions between the counter-revolutionaries sprang, partly, from the factions of the Anden Regime, the essential genesis of the counter-revolution is, naturally, to be found in the opposition to the evolving revolutionary situation of 1789 to 1793. Though the shape and significance of the counter-revolution had been, to some extent, pre-determined by the aristocratic resistance to the radical reform plans of Calonne on the eve of the revolution, the movement itself only gathered force under the direct impact of the events of 1789 and in the widening context of popular support once religious schism had overtaken France in 1791 and after it had become clear, early in 1792, that Austria and Prussia would join the anti-revolutionary crusade proclaimed by both Calonne and Burke as early as 1790. In the first instance, the counterrevolution would not have been more than an aristocratic fronde, if the attempt of the French nobility to seize the levers of political power in the States General had succeeded. The failure of that attempt and the triumph of the Third Estate in the vindication of the National Assembly's claim to political sovereignty, caused the Crown and the aristocracy in the summer of 1789 temporarily to sink their differences in a mutual defence pact. Reactionary influences in the royal council and at the court persuaded Louis XVI that the exaggerated claims of the Third Estate could be scotched, if the procedural wrangles between the privileged and unprivileged orders in the States General were settled by royal arbitration and if a programme of royal reforms was imposed from above and, if necessary, by force of arms.1 The attempt to reach such a solution was made in the so-called royal session of 23 June 1789. The programme of reforms offered by Louis XVI to the Assembly on that occasion is a document of cardinal importance in the history of the counter-revolution.2 In effect, it was, in its final form, a bargain between Louis XVI and the reactionary associates of his younger brother, the Comte d'Artois, according to which the privileged orders, in return for the sacrifice of their fiscal immunities, would have been allowed to retain or commute their feudal dues and to preserve their corporate privileges in Church and State.3 Its importance in the subsequent history of the counter-revolution was that it represented the limit of concession beyond which the monarchy was not prepared to advance in the direction of liberal reform, and the basis on which the political differences between the king and the aristocracy might have been resolved. It would have endowed France with the form of a restricted monarchy as understood by the counter-revolutionaries and have preserved the political and social pretensions of the French aristocracy. To this programme, which was still-born because it was rejected by the National Assembly, the emigre nobility remained, in the subsequent period, more attached than did the French monarchy.1 Just because it also represented the terms upon which the nobility were prepared to accept the revised draft of the reforms previously promoted by Calonne, it provides an explanation for what might otherwise appear inexplicable why it was that Calonne came to be accepted as the leader of the counter-revolution by the very nobility which had hounded him into exile in England in 1787.
The misfortunes which overtook the French nobility in the subsequent period were, however, largely of their own creation. The attacks on their privileged positions, social distinctions and property rights were provoked by their own early attempts at counter-revolution. The capture of the Bastille was the direct result of the attempt of the.reactionaries to isolate and reduce the capital by armed force.2 The burning of the provincial chateaux and of their feudal records, the violence associated with the Great Panic, which swept across France in July and August 1789 have been rightly attributed to popular fears of the activities of " brigands ", supposed to be in the pay of counter-revolutionaries.3 It was in this way that the panic fears of the peasantry spread to the aristocratic and middle class members of the National Assembly and that the feudal regime was partially dismantled on 4 August 1789, in the effort to avert its total collapse. What was swept away, however, in that famous " St. Bartholomew of privilege " was not so much the feudal system as the corporate organization of the Galilean church and of the separatist provinces.4 If, later, the emigre nobility had been contending merely for the restoration of its feudal dues and of an unreformed Ancien Regime, it would never have succeeded in obtaining sufficient popular backing to make civil war in France practical politics. The destruction by the revolutionaries of provincial privileges, the uprooting of the Provincial Estates, the abolition of the provincial Parlements, however, represented not only an attack on aristocratic influence in the French state, but also the determination on the part of the central government to stamp out provincial separatism.1 This was so strongly entrenched in various parts of France that its defenders threw in their lot with the counterrevolution.
Nowhere were these particular forms of discontent with the work of the Parisian revolution more keenly felt than in the former province of Brittany. If we are to understand why it was that the counter-revolutionaries were able to command the loyalty and devotion of such large sections of the Breton population after 1790, emphasis must be placed, not only on the dour attachment of the Breton people to their ancient traditions of provincial independence but also on the sincere religious piety of the Breton peasants which was enflamed by the persecution of the Catholic non-juring clergy, and the solidarity of interest, under the Ancien Regime, between the Breton nobility and their feudal dependents. It is important to realize that Brittany had never really fully accepted even the hesitant and accommodating centralization imposed upon it by the Bourbon monarchy before 1789. The province had been enabled to resist its complete absorption into the bureaucratic machinery of the monarchy, because it could appeal to the " liberties " guaranteed by the Crown in 1532 in the act of union, which had incorporated the former duchy into the French state. But, in the eighteenth century, the essential bulwarks of Breton constitutional independence had been the Provincial Estates and the local high court of appeal or Parlement* When, at the end of the seventeenth century, Brittany had become the last of the French provinces to be subjected to the administrative control of a royal commissioner, or intendant, the magistrates of the Parle-men/ of Rennes had opposed this innovation and, in the eighteenth century, had repeatedly petitioned the Crown for the restoration of the plenary powers of the Provincial Estates in the local administration. As time passed, however, the authority and prestige of the intendant in Brittany, challenged from the beginning by the local judicial magistrates, had been progressively undermined by the expansion of the administrative authority of the Provincial Estates.1 Although this assembly only met once every two years and was, in its general sessions, not much more than a tumultuous gathering of representatives of the three orders of clergy, nobility and certain privileged towns, it had since 1734 established a joint standing commission, which by the end of the century had wrung from the central government responsibility for the supervision of municipal administration, the construction of canals, road communications and other public works, which in the pays Selection lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the intendant. The proceedings of these local Estates were dominated by the lay and clerical nobility, and even the voting procedure was by order, and not by head. Despite this, the representatives of the Third Estate, until the very eve of the revolution, appear to have been well content to play second fiddle to the privileged orders in the defence of the province's fiscal autonomy and its customary privileges. When the revolution swept away these surviving traces of home-rule in Brittany, the Breton people felt that their traditional independence had at last been destroyed.
Even more resented was the persecution of the Catholic priests, who refused to accept the ecclesiastical reforms of the National Assembly. In an area so remote from the main centres of eighteenth-century civilization, the parochial clergy had for long been the chief channel of communication between the government and the largely illiterate population. The Breton peasants, sincerely Catholic in their religious beliefs, had thus been habitually suspicious of the intrusion into their day-to-day affairs of any lay authority. When, therefore, the National X E. Appolis, "Les 6tats de Languedoc au XVIII6 siecle. Comparaison avec les e"tats de Bretagne ", L'Organisation corporative du Moyen Age a la fin de I'Ancien Regime. Etudes presentees a la Commission intemationale pour I'histoire des Assemblies d'itats, Louvain, vol. 2 (1937), pp. 131-48. 
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Assembly first dispossessed and later banished the non-juring clergy, the Bretons had an added cause for dissatisfaction with the revolutionary authorities, and were easily persuaded by the agents of the counter-revolutionaries to take up arms in defence of the schismatical clergy.1
The appeal to arms, in the monarchical interest, however, was made by the lay nobility and the response it evoked in Brittany may be attributed to the peculiarly close relationships which had traditionally existed in the province between the peasantry and its feudal superiors. It would perhaps be incorrect to speak of the existence there of a " clan " system, but certainly the patriarchal control exercised by the Breton nobility over the peasants and farmers in the rural areas was much stricter, though less resented, than elsewhere in France. 2 The Breton nobility was so impoverished and tended, before 1789, to live in such intimate and continuous contact with its tenantry that its standards of living were often not far removed from those of the peasants themselves.
Perhaps in this respect alone was Charles Armand Tumn de la Rouerie typical of the Breton nobility.3 Born in April 1750, he was of noble extraction but his family did not belong to the old nobility and could not be considered rich. He lost his father at an early age and was brought up by his mother. He appears to have attended the same educational pension as the Comte de Mirabeau, where he acquired considerable facility in spoken English and a fair command of German. At the age of seventeen, as an ensign in the regiment of French guards, he had plunged into the gay social life of the capital under the protection and 1 Archives Nationals, F 74590 (Plaquette 7) 13. Report by LalligandMorillon to Lebrun 22 December 1792. " Je crois qu'il faut porter grande attention sur ces disputes religieuses en Bretagne. Le peuple est sans instruction, il est dans la main des pretres r6fractaires qui s'y trouvent en grand nombre. Le fanatisme est le plus grand fleau de ces contr£es. Je crains qu'il ne cause de grands desordres et que les de"sordres soient tres voisins."
2 De Tocqueville pointed out as long ago as 1856 tbat the peasants of La Vendee had supported the aristocratic counter-revolution in the West, not because feudal conditions were better there but because they were worse (L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution, (Euvres completes, ed. J. P. Mayer, ii, 6th edn. (1952), 223) .
3 G. Lenotre, Le Marquis de la Rouerie, chap. i. with the guidance of his uncle, Monsieur de la Belinaye. He soon fell into the usual scrapes and he fell in love with, wished to marry, but was prudently rejected by, a singer at the Opera, Mile, de Beaumesnil, who turned out to be his uncle's mistress. He wounded in a duel, and nearly killed, an intimate friend of Louis XVI the comte de Bourbon Busset. As a result of these youthful escapades, La Rouerie fell into disgrace at Court, was compelled to resign his commission in the Guards, and, after failing to commit suicide by taking opium, withdrew, in a fit of remorse, to a Trappist monastery. After the outbreak of the war of American Independence, he was persuaded by his family to emerge from his seclusion and to offer his services as a volunteer in the Colonial armies. He was one of the first of the French to reach America in April 1777, before Lafayette had even left France. He did so by swimming ashore with three of his followers after his ship had been sunk, close inshore, by a British frigate. He obtained permission from Washington to raise, largely at his own expense, a legion of French irregular troops in time to take part in the campaign of 1777. After this legion had been cut to pieces at the battle of Camden, in Carolina, he had returned to France to equip further forces. Back in America he played a distinguished part, as Colonel Armand, in the decisive capture of Yorktown. 1 Though he was decorated by the American Government with the cross of the Order of Cincinnatus, and given the nominal rank of brigadier-general in the American armies, he found himself, on the conclusion of peace, loaded with debt and without any adequate recognition from the French Government. Though he solved his immediate financial problems by marrying a rich widow, he became a widower shortly afterwards and was left, once more, to vegetate on his Breton estates. Partly out of pique at his continued neglect by the government, he threw in his lot with the aristocratic and magisterial opposition to Lamoignon's judicial reforms of May 1788. These reforms would have destroyed the political powers of the local parlements and have severely restricted their judicial competence.1 In Brittany they were considered to have broken the contractual relations between the Crown and the province. When the Breton Provincial Estates sent a deputation of twelve nobles to Versailles to protest against this invasion of their liberties, La Rouerie was included in the delegation. For this audacity the marquis and his fellows were left to cool their heels in the Bastille from 14 July till the end of August and were only released when the chief Minister, de Brienne, was overthrown and the judicial reforms suspended till the meeting of the States General. Nevertheless, it is significant that when the Third Estate in Brittany revolted against the political predominance of the nobility in the Provincial Estates, and when the Government in December 1788 granted the Third Estate throughout France double representation in the States General, La Rouerie did not associate himself with the recalcitrant attitude then adopted by his fellow nobles.2 On the eve of the revolution, therefore, La Rouerie was still a man with a chip on his shoulder, nursing a sense of grievance against the Government, with his military ambitions unsatisfied and, to some extent, out of step with the more powerful leaders of the Breton nobility. He was an isolated, disillusioned figure, torn between his loyalty to the aristocratic traditions of Breton separatism and an increasing inclination to favour the claims and aspirations of the Breton Third Estate. His bitterness grew when, late in April 1789, the Breton nobility refused to elect representatives to the national Assembly, on the ground that all the Breton delegates should be exclusively elected in their Provincial Estates.3 This ruined his chances of representing his order in the States General. The consequence was that La Rouerie cut himself off further from his order by trying to build up a following among the upper ranks of the Breton middle classes and, by refusing, after 1789, to emigrate.
When, however, in the course of 1791, the hostility in Brittany to the administrative and religious policy of the Constituent Assembly declared itself, La Rouerie's very isolation and his previous experience as commander of irregular forces in America marked him out as a potential leader of a separatist revolt. The chance that had evaded him throughout his chequered and inhibited career had at last arrived. It is not easy to discover when La Rouerie began to make active preparations for a revolt; all that can be said is that secret negotiations for support must have been undertaken some time late in 1790 or early in the following year, for early in June 1791 he was ready to submit his proposals to the emigre court of the Comte d'Artois at Coblenz. Using the pretext of having some private business of his own to conduct abroad, the marquis obtained a regular passport to London, in order to avoid being suspected of attempting to emigrate. Accompanied by a few of his domestics, and by his inseparable companion and cousin Therese de Moelien La Rouerie made his way to England, and crossed into Germany via Ostend. He eventually made contact with the Comte d*Artois in the first week of June at Ulm, obtaining from him a commission to form a Breton association of Royalists, on the understanding that this enterprise should be, so far as possible, self-supporting financially.1 La Rouerie was also authorized to place the association on a military basis, by organizing it as a Legion on the pattern of his American guerilla force. The marquis had already made tentative soundings of Royalist opinion in Brittany and had discovered that potential supporters would be disinclined to commit themselves unless they could be given specific assurances from the emigre court first, as to the precise basis on which monarchical authority would be restored, particularly in relation to Breton provincial liberties, and second, as to what measures would be taken, if they were to support a foreign invasion by civil war, to protect their lives and property in the anarchical conditions before settled order was restored. These points were put to Artois by La Rouerie in the name of the province and it is interesting to note the character of Artois* assurances, which were incorporated in the plenary powers given to the marquis. In this instrument Artois announced, on the first point, his fixed determination to repudiate all schemes aiming at the restoration of despotism and that *' his only object was to enable the king to resume the exercise of an authority tempered by law and to re-establish the true French constitution, which would be quite compatible with reasonable liberty".1 The Bretons were also assured that any foreign military assistance which might be forthcoming would not be purchased at the price of any surrender of national territory and, finally, that one of the first consequences of the restoration of order would be the summons of the Provincial Estates and the full recognition of Breton constitutional privileges.2
On the second point, Artois replied that the emigres would rely partly on the intimidating effects on the revolutionaries of the news of foreign invasion, and partly on the tranquillizing effects on the general population of the counter-revolutionary manifestoes, which would be published at the moment of the general rising. Apart from that, the Breton association itself could usefully undertake the role of a society of vigilantes and deal with the local brigands itself. It was clear from all this that the Association would be thrown back very much upon its own resources and that any external assistance would be subsidiary. No doubt La Rouerie felt that the precise guarantees of Breton provincial liberties would afford him the kind of talisman of which he had felt the need.
His next call was on Calonne the chief minister of the emigre court at Coblenz. Detailed plans were discussed, Calonne promised some financial support and it was agreed that contact between the conspirators in the west and Coblenz should be maintained through an emigre officer, who had served under La Rouerie's orders in America Georges de Fontevieux. Fontevieux had a fluent command of English, French and German and could move about Europe freely as an accredited diplomatic agent of the Prince of Zweibriicken. It was arranged that, while La Rouerie made his way back to Brittany via Paris in disguise, Fontevieux should remain with Calonne to await further instructions.1
The very day that La Rouerie and his companions arrived in Paris, Louis XVI and his family were brought back as captives after their flight had been stopped at Varennes. With this discouraging news, La Rouerie made his way back to Brittany. He set to work at once on the task of secretly organizing his counter-revolutionary association. This work seems to have been undertaken in two stages. The first necessity was to create some kind of administrative structure, to provide it with an intelligence or communications system and to canalize latent loyalist feeling by establishing contact with those who could provide the conspirators with money and manpower. The second stage was to convert the association into a military machine. Most of the remainder of 1791 was spent on the first commitment. La Rouerie resolved to base his organization on the pre-revolutionary system of Breton local government. His plan was to establish in each episcopal town a standing committee or council, consisting of a secretary and six commissioners two from each of the separate orders of clergy, nobility and third estate. These councils were to receive their instructions direct from La Rouerie himself and transmit them to other committees, similarly constituted, operating in other urban centres. It was hoped, in this way, to cover the whole peninsula with a network of intelligence points which could be turned to a military use later. These councils were also to act as recruiting centres, to keep La Rouerie informed of the progress of their preparations, and to make arrangements for the despatch to a common rendezvous, on twenty-four hours' notice, of any forces at their disposal. La Rouerie also intended that they should persuade members of the local national guard and even regular soldiers to throw in their lot with the association.2 1 Rome de la Revolution, vii (1886), 25. CheVetel's narrative. This account of the conspiracy by the man who betrayed it to Danton, was published in the above review by G. Bord. Internal evidence suggests it was written round about 1807 and it must be used with caution. See Lenotre, op. cit. pp. 152-3.
2 P.R.O. P.C. 1/125/380, "Principes d'organisation politique. Association Bretonne ", December 1791.
Between mid-October, when he received news that his commission as chief of the association and commander of the Legion had been confirmed by the Comte de Provence, and early December 1791 La Rouerie succeeded in establishing no less than nineteen of these councils in Brittany and two in Normandy.1 For the most part, he had chosen as his subsidiary centres towns lying either in the coastal districts or on the frontiers of the province his object being to prepare suitable landing places, where emigre or foreign troops could be disembarked, to establish communications with neighbouring provinces, where additional support might be rallied, and also to have operational bases on the circumference of Brittany, from which pressure might be exerted on the interior.
The progress report which La Rouerie despatched to Calonne on 13 December 1791, showed, however, that difficulties were being encountered.2 Along the whole coastline, from Lorient in the far west to St. Brieuc in the north, the local population seemed to be unresponsive or suspicious. Nantes the chief commercial centre, and Brest, the chief naval base, were noted for their attachment to the revolution. Though some success had attended La Rouerie's efforts to win over the local militia, he found he could make little impression on the loyalty of the line regiments. Another handicap was the continuing emigration of the Breton nobility, which was a serious drain upon the potential military strength of the association. Despite warnings from Calonne about the need for destroying all incriminating documents and signatures, La Rouerie found it necessary, in order to inspire confidence in his local councils, to entrust them with certified copies of his own commissions signed by the emigrt princes and copies of the formal deed of association, signed by himself. It is remarkable that, in the latter document, which appears to have been drawn up by La Rouerie without prior consultation with Calonne, the general aims of the association and its legality were supported by somewhat casuistical but not wholly ironical appeals to the principles of the revolutionary constitution of 1791 ! l In sending the minister a copy of the compact, La Rouerie explained that, after all, the covenant had to be framed in such a way as to be " adopted and signed in our own times and by men living in the present century ". 2 It was no doubt very convenient for the Bretons, who considered that they had been deprived of representation in the States General and were suffering from the loss of their ancient constitutional liberties, to invoke the violation of the Rousseauite principle contained in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, that law was the expression of the general will, in the formulation of which all citizens had the right of participating. It was convenient also for counter-revolutionaries to invoke both the right of constitutional amendment and the even more sacred right and duty of insurrection. If the natural and imprescriptible rights of man were defined as " liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression," then the members of the association, in covenanting together to preserve those rights, could hardly be represented as reactionaries. La Rouerie emphasized, however, in a covering letter to Calonne that the actions of the association, as distinct from its professions, would be bound by the powers conferred on him by the princes and by the engagement of its members, under article 2 of the covenant, to subordinate its policy in all things to that of the restored Provincial Estates.3
By the spring of 1792 it had become a matter of urgency for the association, hitherto a para-military organization, to be given a general staff and a chain of command. Once it had become clear that Austria and Prussia would soon be at war with revolutionary France, La Rouerie obtained from Coblenz a fresh commission placing the military command of the province entirely in his hands and subordinating any foreign troops which might invade Brittany to his direct operation control.4 The association then became a Legion organized into divisions, sections and companies with divisional headquarters in each of the nine ecclesiastical dioceses.1 Commissioned rank was not confined to members of the nobility but was given, on the commander's recommendation, strictly in proportion to the number of recruits raised by the members of the association.8 At the higher level of the staff organization a certain representation was conceded to civilians. Non-military directives were to be issued by a peripatetic political council, consisting of one civilian from each diocese, the staff officers and the divisional commanders, presided over by La Rouerie. Operational plans were to be decided by a military council of officers specially summoned by the commander and a few civilians chosen from the political council.
Even when the military framework of insurrection had thus been created, La Rouerie was still faced by the difficult problems of finance and the co-ordination of strategy. Though the members of the local councils of the association had borne the main administrative costs involved, and though all covenanting members undertook to make voluntary contributions, the purchase of arms and equipment necessitated substantial subsidies. 3 The guarantees given by the princes to any loans raised on their behalf in the province did not provide a solution and all that Calonne could offer were the bank notes of the former Discount Bank and forged assignats.* The former, however, could only be discounted at a heavy loss, and the latter could only be put into circulation slowly and by persons prepared to risk their lives in doing so. Though financial aid of this kind did reach La Rouerie, it only came through at very irregular intervals and was inadequate to meet the real needs of his association.5
The larger strategical conception behind the conspiracy, which was probably La Rouerie's own, shows nevertheless that it had a leading role to play in the plans of the counter-revolutionary coalition. The key to this plan was the intention that the Breton Legion and its adherents should gain control of the department of Ille et Vilaine the north-eastern section of the former province. Once this objective had been gained the insurgents would have an excellent strategical base of operations at Rennes, and would be in a position to sever the communications between Paris and the Breton peninsula. It was then confidently expected that the population of the extreme west, which had hitherto been lukewarm in its adherence to the counter-revolution, would go over to the rebels. It was also known that disaffection to the revolutionary government was rife both in Normandy and La Vendee and, if these areas revolted in sympathy, the insurgents would have at their disposal two important stretches of the coast-line, in Poitou and from St. Malo to the mouth of the Seine. The back door would thus stand open for the landing of emigre forces, which had been gathering in the Channel Islands and powerful diversionary movements in the west of France could be timed to coincide with the invasion of north-eastern France by the Austrian, Prussian and emigre armies. Paris would be caught between two forces advancing from the East and West and would be quickly overrun. The time-schedule arranged between Calonne and La Rouerie was that the eastern invasion should occur in September 1792 and that emigre landings in St. Malo and a general rising in Brittany should follow early in October.1
In the summer of 1792 La Rouerie's essential commitments, in accordance with these plans, were to build up the military strength of his Legion, so as to be able to swing his forces into action at the agreed moment, to prevent any premature local risings in the West and, so far as possible, to preserve the secret of the concerted strategy. In none of these tasks was he successful, partly because these aims proved to be incompatible. The recommendation to the local councils of the association to tamper with the loyalty of the regular troops in the province was injudicious and resulted in the prosecution before the departmental criminal tribunals of those who attempted to carry it out. 1 All La Rouerie's attempts to put a stop to the emigration of the Breton nobility proved unavailing, and his desperate appeals to Calonne for arms and equipment at this period reveal the inadequacy of the supplies at his disposal.2 At the end of May 1792 the military activity at La Rouerie's headquarters near St. Malo attracted the attention of the departmental authorities and the marquis and his staff soon found themselves fugitives from revolutionary justice. Throughout the summer, as the excitement in the West rose, La Rouerie was in hiding, under an assumed name, flitting from one remote country estate to another. The control of the local activities of his supporters from his peripatetic and indeed fugitive headquarters was inevitably incomplete. In this way premature risings occurred at different times at Rennes, Avranches and elsewhere and these were easily stamped out. The revolutionary authorities were alerted and the existence of the conspiracy could no longer be concealed.
Worst of all, and unknown to La Rouerie, his intentions were betrayed to the revolutionary government in Paris, by a boon companion of his youth and his former doctor a man called Chevetel.3 Though Chevetel had, before the revolution, obtained a post as consultant to the household of the Comte de Provence on La Rouerie's recommendation, he had been converted, after 1789, to advanced democratic views through his friendship with Dr. Marat, who had held a similar appointment to the bodyguard of the Comte d'Artois, and with Danton, who was one of his neighbours in Paris. On his way back to Brittany in June 1791 La Rouerie had incautiously spoken to Chevetel in 2 Writing to Calonne on 10 January 1792, La Rouerie noted as causes of the continued emigration rumours that noblemen who did not emigrate would lose their noble status. Wives of Breton nobles were also firmly convinced that their husbands would only be safe under the protection of the princes (P.R.O. P.C. 1/124/170). In June 1792 Fontevieux complained that of 4,000 rifles promised to La Rouerie by Calonne, only 1,000 had been delivered (P.C. 1/125/379).
3 For Chevetel see Lenotre, Le Marquis de la Rouerie, passim.
Paris of his contact with the emigre court at Coblenz, but had not revealed his plans for a counter-revolution in the West. Subsequently, however, Fontevieux La Rouerie's contact man with Coblenz had consulted Chevetel on ways and means of discounting in Paris the commercial paper of the Discount Bank, which Calonne had placed at the disposal of the conspirators. Knowing that Chevetel was an intimate friend of the marquis, and discovering that he knew of La Rouerie's connections with Calonne, Fontevieux had assumed that Chevetel was already cognizant of their plans and had revealed to him the full extent of the preparations for a Breton rising. Chevetel had kept this secret to himself and had let himself become involved in the conspiracy with the idea of betraying his associates at the right moment.1 Chevetel appears to have confided this information to Danton some time in the first week of August 1792 just before the overthrow of the monarchy. The rest of the month was spent by the doctor in Brittany in daily contact with the leading conspirators.2 He returned to Paris at the beginning of September, just as the prison massacres were starting, and obtained an interview with Danton, who was then a member of the provisional executive council as Minister of Justice, on 3 September. What exactly passed between Chevetel and Danton on that occasion it is impossible to discover. Some of the evidence suggests that Danton did not pass on the information about La Rouerie's plans to his ministerial colleagues until early October.3 Chevetel's own account, which unfortunately is not wholly trustworthy, states categorically that the Breton rising was not discussed.4 All that is established is that Chevetel was despatched from Paris the same day as a commissioner of the executive council, armed with full powers to expedite the withdrawal of the regular troops and artillery from Brittany, in order that they could be redeployed against the invading Prussian armies on the north-eastern frontier. to La Rouerie's headquarters at the chateau of La Fosse-Hingant, near St. Malo, but, having been delated by one of the conspirators, he was accused by the marquis of treachery. In reply Chevetel coolly admitted having revealed the conspiracy to Danton, but apparently convinced the Breton leaders that he had won over the minister to the counter-revolution, producing in support of this story an autograph letter of Danton to La Rouerie announcing his general sympathy with his objectives, and exhibiting his commission to transfer the regular troops and artillery to the eastern frontiers. 1 If these powers were used he suggested that the Breton rising would meet with only local resistance and the eastward march of the conspirators would be facilitated. La Rouerie seized on this chance eagerly, and admitted Chevetel into the innermost councils of the association, thereby ensuring his complete betrayal at a later stage. The rest of my story is an anti-climax. Dumouriez's victory against the Prussians at Valmy on 20 September and the subsequent retreat of the invading armies ruined whatever chances of success the Breton rising had at that point. A further setback was that the British Government, prompted by the fears of the local inhabitants, laid an embargo on the transports in the Channel Islands waiting to land the emigre forces and their equipment at St. Malo.2 The orders for a rising which had been timed for 10 October had to be countermanded, and the plans for a general insurrection in the West had to be deferred till the spring of 1793, when it was expected that Great Britain would have joined the European anti-revolutionary coalition.
Meanwhile, early in October, after it had become clear that the Prussian retreat was continuing and that the emigre armies were breaking up, Danton communicated his knowledge of the Breton conspiracy to the newly established committee of General Security.3 La Rouerie's conspiracy thus became a matter for official counter-espionage, and owing to the activity and resource of Chevetel and Lalligand-Morillon, who were commissioned to undertake this work, every move of the conspirators in the winter of 1792 was reported back to Lebrun, the minister of Foreign Affairs. 1 Chevetel played the dual role of pseudo-conspirator and government secret agent to perfection. Together with Fontevieux he was entrusted by La Rouerie with the mission of concerting plans for a more general rising in the spring of 1793 with the retreating emigre princes.2 In late October he even had interviews with Calonne himself in London, and when he returned to Paris in January 1793 from Aix-la-Chapelle, where he had seen the comte d'Artois, he was able to lay the revised and most secret operational plans of the conspirators before the revolutionary government.3 Early in the following month Chevetel and Morillon were given plenary powers by the committee of General Security to arrest La Rouerie and his chief associates and thus to decapitate the conspiracy on the eve of the general rising in the West.4 La Rouerie cheated his pursuers by dying at the end of January overcome by his exertions and prostrated by the news of Louis XVI's execution. By invoking the assistance of the local National Guards and municipal authorities, Chevetel and Morillon were able to round up twentysix of La Rouerie's leading associates by the first week of March and to bring them, under military escort, to Paris. In June these were brought before the Revolutionary Tribunal and twelve of them, including Fontevieux, and several women, were executed.5 The Breton rising, as planned by La Rouerie, had thus proved a fiasco. 1 Morillon's reports to the committee of General Security and to Lebrun are preserved partly in F7 4590 (Plaq. 7) at the Archives Nationals and partly in the French Foreign Office archives.
2 Chevetel and Morillon decided not to act against the conspirators at this point partly because they could not depend on the departmental criminal tribunals to condemn them and partly in order to discover their revised plans for a general rising (Morillon to committee of General Security, 19 October 1792, Archives National. F7 4590 (Plaq. 7) 3).
3 See Ch6vetel's narrative, Revue de la Revolution, vii. 34-5. 4 Archives Nationales AF II*. 288, 7 February 1793. In order to guard against Morillon's treachery the committee of General Security commissioned another secret agent, Sicard, to watch his activities and supersede him if necessary (ibid.).
6 Archives Nationales, W 273/59. The Acte d'accusation before the Revolutionary Tribunal was dated 31 May 1793. The execution took place on 18 June.
In contrast with its immediate ineffectiveness, however, this conspiracy had far-reaching repercussions on the subsequent history of the counter-revolution. La Rouerie's first achievement was to demonstrate how the traditions of local particularism and provincial economic discontents could be exploited in the interests of reaction. Though he had been unable to arrest the progress of the emigration, he had seen how to make use of the local unemployment, which had been one of its consequences, by drawing into his service, as unobtrusive messengers, those wandering beggars who then infested the Breton countryside.1 Similarly, he had been quick to recruit into his organization those salt-smugglers and revenue officers, whose livelihood had been destroyed by the Constituent Assembly's suppression of the gabelle.2 Equally ingenious had been the " protection " which La Rouerie had sold to the more prosperous classes, who were afraid for their lives and property, in return for financial subsidies to his association. Such individuals had then been encouraged to make a show of " revolutionary zeal " and to allow themselves to become elected members of the local revolutionary municipalities, where they had proved extremely useful to the counter-revolutionaries as spies and informers.3
Secondly, contemporary opinion is agreed that Chouannerie -that indigenous form of Breton anti-revolutionary guerilla warfare was the invention, not of the fabulous Jean " Chouan " but of La Rouerie himself.4 Chouannerie in the subsequent period relied on the familiar tactics of all modern resistance movements attacks on military convoys, night raids and ambushes by small detachments, the arrest of food supplies to the urban centres, the subversion of the revolutionary armies, the harassing of the local " constituted " authorities and the skilful exploitation of local topographical knowledge.5 Such methods, may, of course, have been forced on the Breton association by its lack of adequate military supplies and equipment. It is, however, evident that in devising these tactics La Rouerie had drawn on his experience as a leader of irregular forces in the American war, his profound insight into Breton popular psychology, and his appreciation of the potentialities of the peculiar physical features of the Armorican peninsula. Chouannerie, in this form, continued to plague successive revolutionary governments until Bonaparte healed the religious schism and pacified the Catholic west by his Concordat with the Papacy in 1801. Nor is it fanciful to trace the influence of Chouannerie in the Royalist conspiracies against Bonaparte's life and regime in 1801 and 1804, for Picot de Limoelan had been one of La Rouerie's aides de camp, while Cadoudal was one of the Chouan leaders.
Lastly, La Rouerie seems to have been at least partly responsible for the conversion of Calonne and the emigre princes to the idea of regional civil war as the chief strategical conception of the counter-revolution. In 1792 Calonne and the emigre leaders had pinned their hopes, not so much on local insurrections in the interior of France, which they had some difficulty in controlling and subsidizing, as on the military forces of Austria and Prussia.1 After the Prussian retreat and the disbandment of the emigre armies in the winter of 1792, Calonne realized that the best chances of a successful counter-revolution lay in the multiplication throughout France of regional revolts on the separatist pattern that had been set by La Rouerie and the Breton Association.2 The terrifying progress of the risings in La Vendee and the Federalist revolts in central and southern France in the spring and summer of 1793 proved how serious a threat the new strategy was to the very existence of the Republic.
In this fresh crisis the unity and indivisibility of France was only salvaged by the Jacobin dictatorship in Paris and the new and more terrible form of centralization, forged and controlled by the Committee of Public Safety.
Breton separatism, however, died hard. In the nineteenth century it assumed the less recalcitrant form of mere regionalism, of which the importance was cultural and economic rather than political. 1 APPENDIX " Association simplement defensive des honetes gens, contre attroupement de factieux, Brigands ou Malfaiteurs." (Copy initialed by La Rouerie, sent to Calonne 14 December 1791, P.R.O. P.C. 1/125/373.)
Nous soussigne"s, citoyens de la Province de Bretagne, croyons devoir donner les motifs de notre presente association, de*clarons, d'abord unanimement que le voeu le plus cher a notre coeur est celui de vivre libre ou mourir, qu'exprimait, par son organisation, notre ancien gouvernement Breton et que prescrit, d'ailleurs, 1'article 6 de la section 5 du chapitre 1 er de la constitution f rancaise du 3 Septembre 1791, et que notre intention n'est que de propager aucuns principes, ni de nous permettre aucuns actes qui puissent etre pris pour une violation meme indirect de ce serment.
Nous declarons, de plus, qu'il doit etre bien entendu qu'il n'exclut de notre part 1'obeissance et la fidelite que nous devons au Roi, notre legitime souverain, et que nous regarderons au contraire comme nos ennemis declares tous ceux qui abusent de ses bienfaits et de sa tendre sollicitude pour son peuple, cherchent a affaiblir son autorite tutelaire, a diminuer ses prerogatives et a an6antir son trone par 1'insinuation criminelle d'id6es re"publicaines, a la propagation desquelles il est de notre devoir, en bons et fideles sujets, de nous opposer de toutes nos forces.
Nous declarons, enfin, que nous adoptons sans restriction ce principe el6-mentaire de la constitution actuelle, et qui se trouve consign^ dans Tarticle 6 de la Declaration des droits de I'homme et du citoyen, que la loi est 1'expression de la volonte g£n6rale, et que tous les citoyens ont droit de concourir personnellement a sa formation. Et, a ce sujet, nous observons que le principe des malheurs publics qui affligent, a ce moment, le Royaume, et en particulier la province de Bretagne, ne provient que de ce que dans la pratique on a trop meconnu cette theorie de legislation, sans laquelle il n'y a plus de vraie liberte" publique, que de la sont n6es successivement ces factions dangereuses qui divisent le Royaume et que Ton connait sous les denominations de factions r6publicaines, royalistes, monarchiennes et autres ; que par la encore le respect du a la Loi, s'est naturellement affaibli, des que, d'un cote la naissance de toutes ces factions, et de 1'autre, les murmures du peuple, n'ont que trop clairement manifeste qu'elle n'avait 1 G. Pariset, " Histoire du Regionalisme Francois ", Etudes d 'Histoire R&~ volutionnaire et contemporaine (1929) , pp. 287~313. pas pour elle cette expression de la volonte generale, qui seule forme son plus imposant caractere.
Nous observons, de plus, que c'est surtout la Province de Bretagne qui peut plus que tout autre encore, se plaindre qu'on ait viole envers elle ce principe de la declaration des droits que nulle loi ne peut etre regardee comme telle, si elle n'est 1'expression de la volonte generale, puisqu'elle n'a 6t6 convoquee, ni represented re"gulierement aux Etats Generaux de 1789, et puisqu'elle n'en a pas moins perdu son antique constitution et ses droits, franchises et libertes, contre le voeu formel de ses trois ordres, et meme les dispositions precises de la grande majorite" des cahiers des assemblies partielles de senechausse'es, form6es pour eluder et suppleer alors la convocation constitutionelle du tiers comme ordre politique et indivisible. 1
Nous observons, enfin, que c'est encore la violation du meme principe et le defaut d'assentiment gen6ral qui a determine" et determine encore journellement cette emigration desastreuse pour le peuple, non seulement des princes du sang, des grands du Royaume, des eveques, des anciens magistrals, des nobles, des riches proprietaires ; mais encore des artistes et des ouvriers en tout genre; et qu'inutilement a-t-on eu et a-t-on recours pour suppleer cette expression de la volonte generale requise par la declaration des droits, a des serments pretes dans le desordre de la crainte, ou le tumulte de 1'anarchie, puisqu'ils ne peuvent donner aux lois qu'un caractere de despotisme, loin de leur en impnmer un de convention franche, libre et volontaire entre tous les citoyens qu'elles doivent regir.
Nous dedarons, en outre, que nous adoptons encore, sans restriction, cette disposition de 1'article l er, section 3e du chapitre 3 de la nouvelle constitution, qui consacre le droit indispensable au caractere de la monarchic qu'a le Roi de concourir a la formation de la loi, en lui reconnaissant celui d'y refuser son consentement; nous faisons meme profession de croire que ce droit ancien de la monarchic francaise est 1'un des plus fermes remparts de la liberte publique, qui sans 1'exercice libre de ce droit, pourrait bientot se trouver compromise par la premiere faction assez audacieuse pour la vouloir enchainer ou la subordonner aux pro jets de son ambition ou de ses vengeances.
Mais nous observons, encore, que la declaration du Roi du 23 juin 1789; que le memoire d'observation par lui adresse a 1'Assemblee Nationale sur les arretes de cette assemblee des 4 aout et jours suivants, et que sa protestation solennelle du 20 juin 1791, sont autant d'actes qui absolument contraires a 1'acceptation qu'il a faite de la constitution, ne sont propres consequemment qu'a fortifier les soupcons assez generalement repandus sur le defaut de liberte de cette acceptation. 2 1 According to an electoral regulation of 16 March 1789, Necker had laid it down that, whereas the Breton privileged orders should meet at St. Brieuc to draw up their cahiers and elect deputies, the representatives of the third estate should be elected, as elsewhere in France, in the assemblies of the senechaussees (A. Brette, Recueil de documents relatifs a la convocation des Etats generaux de 1789, i. 259-62) . In protest the privileged orders had refused to elect representatives to the States General (J. Egret, " Les origines de la Revolution en Bretagne ", Revue Historique, ccxiii (1955), 211) .
2 For the Royal Proclamation of 20 June 1791 see J. M. Thompson, French Revolution Documents, 1789 -94 ( 1933 , pp. 86-92. According to Etienne Dumont Nous observons de plus que ces memes soupcons s'accroissent de 1'outrageante captivite ou sa Majeste etait retenue a 1'epoque oil cette constitution lui a &£ presentee, et surtout, de cette circonstance majeure que le de"faut d'acceptation de sa part importait contre lui la perte de son trone et de sa couronne, surtout au milieu de la fermentation et de 1'effervescence dont il e"tait environne*.
Instruits et certains par les declarations des Princes, freres du Roi, qu'en proposant d'entrer en France avec une force suffisante, ils n'ont d'autre objet que d'assurer d'un cote la liberte dans laquelle le Roi doit enfin exprimer ses ve"ritables intentions, et de 1'autre, de donner au peuple, en le mettant a 1'abri de tout despotisme, le droit de manifester aussi sans contrainte, son voeu sur la legislation et sur le regime qui a multiplie ses charges en ane'antissant son commerce et ses ressources.
Considerant que 1'objet unique de leur entree n'est consequemment que de mettre la nation a lieu de reconnaitre si les nouvelles lois qui la regissent, ont les deux caracteres qui seuls les peuvent constituer, celui d'etre 1'expression de la volonte du peuple, et celui d'avoir etc" librement consenties par le Monarque, et que c'est par consequent rendre hommage a la constitution elle-meme, que de concourir avec eux a imposer silence aux factions et a prevenir les intrigues qui pourraient gener 1'expression de ce double voeu.
Considerant, d'ailleurs, que la Constitution elle-meme reconnait, article l er du titre 7, que la Nation a le droit imprescriptible de changer quand il lui plait, les lois constitutionelles, d'ou resulte que proteger le libre exercice d'un semblable droit en faveur de la nation, ce n'est que se permettre un acte autorise et permis par la constitution actuelle.1 Considerant, en outre, qu'on ne peut pas se dissimuler que le mecontentement du peuple se propage de plus en plus ; que 1'eloignement general qu'il t6moigne pour les pretres constitutionels, que la desertion egalement ge"nerale de leurs e*glises n'annoncent que trop clairement que le voeu de la grande majorite du peuple est contraire aux lois, qui ont divise 1'ancienne eglise, et aneanti le clerg£ francais, sans aucuns motifs d'utilite publique.
Considerant qu'on ne peut pas se dissimuler davantage que la misere publique s'aggrave de jour en jour, que le commence languit de plus en plus; que les anciennes ressources du peuple s'aneantissent; et que cependant il voit, en murmurant, ses charges s'accroitre, et jusqu'a la religion devenir pour lui la matiere d'un nouvel impot.
Consid^rant que son experience actuelle, acceleree par le sentiment de ses propres souffrances et par I'inutJHte' de tous ses sacrifices passes, lui fait assez generalement desirer une prompte revision du regime auquel on 1'a assujeti, en 1'egarant par la promesse d'un Bonheur, dont il est fort eloigne de jouir, et qu'il ne peut trouver dans le nouveau systeme. the royal memorandum against the decrees of 4 August had been composed by Necker and was badly received by the Assembly (Souvenirs sur Mirabeau et sur les deux premieres Assemblies Legislatives, ed. J. Bene"truy (1950), p. 106).
1 No mention is here made of the restrictions placed on the right of constitutional amendment in Articles II to VII of Titre VII of the Constitution. See J. M. Thompson, op. cit. pp. 145-6. Considerant, que s'est ici, plus que jamais, le cas de reconnaitre et la n6cessit£ de consulter la volonte generale, et celle d'avouer la souverainte si vantee de la nation dans 1'article l er du titre 3 de la constitution.
Considerant, que si I'assemblee constituante a professe publiquement le principe que 1'insurrection etait le plus saint des devoirs de la part du peuple ; quand lasse d'un regime quelconque, il voulait en adopter un autre plus utile et plus conforme a ses vrais interets, personne ne peut, a plus forte raison, blamer une association paisible faite pour prevenir des dangers de Insurrection en assurant au peuple le droit de manifester sa volonte d'une maniere moins desastreuse.
Considerant, que cette volonte du peuple n'est actuellement etouffee et enchamee que par son defaut de reunion en masse, resultant du demembrement des provinces, que par la defense qui lui a etc faite de se permettre aucunes deliberations sur les matieres publiques dans ses assemblies primaires ou electorates,1 que par la privation prononcee centre lui du droit de manifester son voeu d'une maniere imperative dans ses pouvoirs a ceux qu'on dit etre ses represants,2 et que 1'expression libre de cette meme volonte generate est de plus comprimee par le grand nombre d'individus nouveaux qui doivent leur etat et leurs fonctions publics a la revolution actuelle ; par ceux qui, par 1'exaltation de leurs principes et de leurs id6es, s*y sont rendus coupables, sinon d'exces, au moins de precedes reprehensibles, et plus encore par tous ceux, qui surcharges des bienfaits du Monarque, se sont par les plus coupables des ingratitudes, rendus criminels envers lui du crime de Leze-Majeste et qui, pour se derober aux peines capitales qu'ils ont encourues, multiplient aujourd'hui toutes les intrigues pour entretenir 1'egarement du peuple, ou retarder remission de son voeu sur le re~girr%auquel ils 1'ont assujeti et dont ils maitrissent et dirigent les ressorts.
Considerant, que cet etat de choses est d'ailleurs infiniment ruineux pour la France, par la notoire dilapidation des finances employees tant au dehors qu'~ interieurement, par les agents principaux de la revolution actuelle, a seduire et & corrompre tous ceux qu'on croit necessaires ou a la maintenir ou a en completer les resultats ; ce qui, avec la Banqueroute de 1'etat, presage au peuple une longue surcharge d'impositions excessives et extraordinaires.
Considerant, enfin, que la prompte rentree en France des Princes, des Grands, des Nobles, des riches proprietaires, et des capitalistes emigres, peut seul rendre aux manufactures du royaume leur activite; au commerce son aisance, aux ouvriers leurs travaux, aux echanges ordinaires de la vie le numeraire qui seul en est le signe le plus reellement representatif.
Sur tous ces motifs, uniquement animes de 1'amour du bien public, ne desirant nous associer que pour, aux termes de 1'article 2 de la declaration des droits de 1'homme et du citoyen, nous assurer respectivement liberte, propriete, sflrete, et resistance a 1'oppression, un evenement que lors de 1'entree des princes francais dans le Royaume, des mal intentionnes leur pretant calomnieusement centre leur patrie des vues hostiles qu'ils n'ont pas, les forces qui les accompagneront n'etant destines qu'a reprimer les factions, et a proteger, tout a la fois, la liberte du Roi dans 1'expression de son voeu, et la liberte du peuple dans la proclamation du sien, les memes mal intentionne"s ne se portent eux-memes a des actes d'hostilite, de devastation des proprietes ou d* insurrection centre les personnes dont 1'opinion particuliere ne seconderait pas leurs vues s£diteuses et inte*resse*es, nous en consequence sommes convenus et avons promis, sous notre parole d'hommes, d'ex6cuter et nous conformer aux clauses qui suivent; Article l er Nous dedarons nous associer pour lors de I'entr6e de Monsieur et de Mgr. Comte d'Artois en France, concourir par les moyens qui nous seront indique's, tant par Mr le Marquis de la Rouerie, chef de la pre"sente association et son correspondant general, qu'en consequence de ses instructions par les comite's, dont il sera ci-apres parle, a maintenir dans 1'interieur de la province, 1'ordre, la tranquillity et la paix, prote*ger le rassemblement de ses etats, sur la convocation desquels nous avons lieu de compter, et nous defendre respectivement envers et contre tous en cas d'insurrection contre les biens ou les personnes, promettant au reste de ne nous porter jamais a aucune aggression et nous soumettre, dans le re*sultat, au voeu librement et spontane"ment 6mis par nos etats re"gulierement convoques et assembles.
Art6. 2.
Comme il serait difficile de determiner les divers cas oil il nous sera utile d'agir, nous promettons le faire conforme'ment aux plans et instructions qui seront communiques et donnes par notre dit Sieur de la Rouerie, et interme'diarement, par le comite etabli dans la ville de notre residence.
Art6. 3.
Dans chaque ville de la province ce comite sera compose de six membres, dont deux gentilshommes, deux e*ccle"siastiques et deux membres du tiers; et en outre d'un secretaire. Les fonctions de ces comites seront de correspondre tant avec le chef de 1'association, ci-dessus nomme, qu'entre eux et partout oil besoin sera, et d'instruire le corps de 1'association des diverses mesures qu'il lui conviendra de prendre suivant les circonstances pour le maintien de la paix et le bien-etre de la Province.
Art6. 4.
L'association, en cas de guerre-civile, ou invasion dangereuse, s'armera seulement pour la protection et la defense des personnes et des biens des citoyens attaque"s a raison de leurs opinions politiques ou religieuses. Les membres armes seront indemnis6s lorsqu'ils seront en activite de service.
Art6. 5.
Chaque comite travaillera incessamment a 1'organisation de tous les partis (?) qui doivent donner a 1'association 1'activite necessaire.
Art6. 6.
Conformement aux intentions et promesses des Princes, les citoyens qui auront rendu le plus de services importants dans les divers objets de la pre"sente association, leur seront indique's pour etre par le Roi promus aux places et emplois, qui servant de recompense a leurs services, les mettront a lieu de se rendre de plus en plus utiles a la chose publique, d'une maniere plus generate et moins oragense.
